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Ritz: The Law of Set-Off and Recoupment in West Virginia

THE LAW OF SET-OFF AND RECOUPIMENT IN
WEST VIRGINIA.

RUSSBLL S. RiTz*
Among the many deserving considerations of the remedies
of set-off and recoupment one cannot but wonder why it is
that these two remedies, differing as they do in so many important particulars, are interchangeably referred to and
spoken of. Some courts loosely use the name of one when
the other is intended. The only analogous features pertaining to these remedies, as we believe, is that both must be the
subject of an independent action which may be asserted in
a cross demand. The subject matter to support either of
these remedies is entirely different and the character of relief
available under either is likewise different. They are likewise entirely different in origin, one finding its basis in the
common law, the other in statutory enactment. These two
remedies, however, do merge upon common ground in this,
that conflicting demands between litigants may be set up
and determined in one action. The right to settle and
determine conflicting demands between litigants in one cause
of action avoids a multiplicity of legal contests and furnishes
an expeditious settlement of differences between litigants,
saving extra costs and charges, so that these remedies do perform a very useful and beneficial function in the legal practice. Inasmuch as they are resorted to interchangeably to
represent the subject matter of cross demands, a consideration of their points of difference may furnish a very satisfactory negative definition of each of them. These distinguishing marks may be more easily observed in the abstract
than applied in actual practice.
Recoupment represents a claim for damages arising out of
a breach of the contract or some part of the contract which
is the basis of the plaintiff's cause of action, while the sub* Member of the Bar of Bluefield, West Virginia.
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ject matter of set-off must arise out of a contract independent
of the one sued on by the plaintiff.
Recoupment makes claim for unliquidated damages, whereas the claim of set-off, must be liquidated.
lRecoupment is limited in recovery to reducing or extinguishing the plaintiff's demand with no right of recovery
over, while set-off may be relied upon to reduce or extinguish
the plaintiff's demand and if in excess thereof a recovery
over may be had for such excess.
Recoupment is of common law origin, while set-off is
wholly a creature of statute.
Set-off must be pleaded or an account thereof filed with a
plea, whereas recoupment is set up by notice.1
From these marked points of difference may we not briefly
define these remedies? First, jointly: they consist of the
right of a defendant to assert against the plaintiff in an
action at law an independent cause of action in the reduction
or extinguishment of the plaintiff's demand. Second, recoupment consists of that remedy open to a defendant to
assert against the plaintiff a claim for unliquidated damages
arising out of a breach by the plaintiff of the contract sued
on by him, such damages to be limited to reducing or extinguishing of the plaintiff's demand;' while the remedy of
set-off may be defined to be that right open to the defendant
to have one or more liquidated items of account based upon
IB. &. 0. R. R. Co. v. Jameson, 13 W. Va. 833 (1878) ; Krause v. Greenfield, 61 Ore. 502, 123 Pac. 392 (1912); Ann. Cas. 1914"13 119; Fairbanks,
Morse & Co. v. Breckinridge, 84 W.. Va. 233, 99 S. E. 398 (1919) ; Natural
Gas Co. -u. Healy, 33 W. Va. 102, 10 S. B. 56 (1889); Hoo, PLDO. & PRAO.
202-207; Buan, PLDG. & PRAC. 448; 34 Cyc. 643; St. Louis Nat'l Bank v.
Gay, 101 Cal. 286, 35 Pac. 876 (1894); Fontaine v. Baxley, 90 Ga. 416, 17
S. E. 1015 (1892); 21 Cyc. 221; Kelly-Springfield, Road Roller Co. v. Coffman, 69 W. Va. 635, 72 S. E. 749 (1911) ; Raleigh Lumber Co. v. W. A. Wilson & Son, 69 W. Va. 598, 72 S. E. 651 (1911) ; Letterman v. Lumber Co., 110
Va. 769, 67 S. E. 281 (1910); J. C. Orrick & Son Co. v. Dawson, 67 W. Va.
403, 68 S. E. 39 (1910); Bowling v. Walls, 72 W. Va. 638, 78 S. E. 791
(1913) ; Wilson v. Wiggin, 73 W, Va. 560, 81 S. E. 842 (1914) ; Monongahela
Tie & Lumber Co. v. Flannigan, 77 W. Va. 162, 87 S. E. 161 (1915); Allen
v. Hart, 18 Gratt. (Va.) 722 (1868); Wartman v. Yost, 22 Gratt. (Va.)
595 (1872).
224 B. C. L. 851; 34 Cyc. 695; Winder v. Caldwell, 14 How. (U. S.) 434,
14 L. ed. 487 (1852); West v. Hayes, 104 Ind. 251, 3 N. M. 932 (1885).
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THE LAW RECOUPMENT

obligations independent of the contract sued on, set-off
against the plaintiff's claim in reducing or extinguishing the
same, or if they be in excess of the plaintiff's claim to permit
a recovery over of such excess.3
The remedy of recoupment is as old as the common law.
Formerly it amounted simply to the right to reduce the
plaintiff's claim, but by judicial precedent it has been enlarged so that the defendant may be permitted to entirely
extinguish the plaintiff's claim. The term "recoupment" is
of French origin and signifies cutting again or cutting back,
or stopping something which is due.4 The early use of the
remedy of recoupment was confined to very narrow limits
and amounted to little, if anything, more than the mere right
of reducing the plaintiff's claim on the ground that his
damages were really not as high as alleged. So limited was
it in application that it was of but little use and for a time
became almost obsolete. The principle, however, has always
been retained, and as developed by the courts of this country,
it has attained a wider and more extended application than
in England.5

3 24 R. C. L. 802, 803, 810, 855, 883; 1 BARTON, LAW PRAc. 810; 8 George
II, ch. 24; B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Jameson, supra n. 1; McSmithee v. Feamster,
4 %M.Va. 673 (1871); Pottery Co. v. Parker, 86 W. Va. 580, 104 S. E. 51
(1920) ; Navigation Co. v. Rice, 9 W. Va. 636 (1876); Cohen P. Gutherie,
15 W. Va. 100 (1879) ; Board of Education v. Cain, 28 W. Va. 758 (1886) ;
Guano Co. v. Appling, 33 W. Va. 470, 10 S. E. 809 (1890); Monongahela
Tie & Lumber Co. v. Flannigan, supra n. 1; Tidewater Quarry Co. v. Scott,
105 Va. 160, 52 S. E. 835 (1906); Johnson v. Johnson, 83 W. Va. 593, 98
W. Va. 204, 100 S. E. 68 (1919);
S. E. 812 (1919); Watring v. Gibson, 84
4
Van Raalte v. Solof Bros. Co., 89 W. a. 66, 108 S. E. 488 (1921) ; Pulp
& Paper Co. v. W)iitmore, 89 W. Va. 622, 109 S. E. 722 (1921); Levine
Bros. v. Mantell, 90 W. Va. 166, 111 S. B. 501 (1922); American Sugar
Refining Co. v. Grocery Co., 90 W. Va. 730, 111 S. E. 759 (1922); Taylor
v. Fields, 91 W. Va. 27, 112 S. E. 211 (1922); Fuel Co. v. Coal Co., 94 W.
Va. 442, 119 S. E. 176 (1923); Cross v. Gall, 65 W. Va. 276, 64 S. E. 533
(1909)); Francisco v. Shelton, 85 Va. 779, 8 S. E. 789 (1889); McAllister
v. Millheiser, 96 Ga. 474, 23 S. E. 502 (1895); 34 Cyc. 670; U. S. V. Tillou,
0 Wall. (U. S.) 486, 18 L. ed. 920 (1867) ; Scott -v. Armstrong, 146 U. S.
499, 36 L. ed. 1059 (1892); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S.
540, 46 L. ed. 679 (1902).
4Davenport v. Hubbard, 46 Vt. 200, 14 Am. Rep. 620 (1873); Williams
v. Neely, 134 Fed. 1 (1904).
a B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Jameson, supra, n. 1.
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Mr. Justice Gray, speaking for the Federal Supreme Court,
very tersely approves of the enlarged rights under recoupment as follows:
"But in this country the Courts, in order to avoid
circuity of action, have gone further, and have
allowed the defendant to recoup damages suffered by
him for any fraud, breach of warranty or negligence
of the plaintiff, growing out of and relating to the
transaction in question."'
Judge Green, speaking for the West Virginia Court, confirms the same right in announcing:
"When the basis of plaintiff's action is contract,
and his complaint is that there has been a breach of
such contract by the defendant, then the defendant
may, if he chooses, recoup any damages which may
have resulted to him by a breach of another portion
of the same contract or of a contract made at the
same time and constituting a part and parcel of the
same transaction.""
The right to set up a claim for damages by way of recoupment is not compulsory. A defendant may elect to prosecute an independent cause of action against the plaintiff,
especially in those instances wherein the defendant's claim
for damages is in excess of the plaintiff's demand. If he so
elects he cannot be precluded from prosecuting an independent action for a recovery of that which he may have set up
by recoupment, even thought he may have appeared and
made defense to the plaintiff's cause of action involving the
same contract out of which he claims damages by reason of
the plaintiff's breach. If, however, the defendant makes
cross-claim for damages by reason of a breach of the contract sued on by the plaintiff, he is precluded from asserting
any such claim thereafter in any other cause of action, notwithstanding his damages may have been largely in excess
of the plaintiff's demand. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for
the Federal Supreme Court, announces this rule:
6 Dushane

v. Benedict, 120 U. S. 630, 30 L. ed. 810 (1887).
1, 19 (1884).

7 Loggie v. Black, 24 W. Va
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"Therefore, although there has been a difference
of opinion as to whether a defendant, by pleading it,
(a cross demand) is concluded by the judgment from
bringing a subsequent suit for the residue of his
claim, a judgment in his favor being impossible at
common law, the authorities agree that he is not
concluded by the judgment if he does not plead his
cross demand, and that whether he shall do so or not
is left wholly to his choice."'
The subject matter for recoupment must be such as would
support an independent cause of action and the defendant
is not required to set the same up by way of recoupment,
but if he does do so he is bound thereby and precluded from
thereafter asserting the same.'
Where the plaintiff, however, bases his right to recover
against the defendant on the quantum meruit, it would seem
that the defendant would be required to set up any claim
for damages by way of recoupment he may have, because
the plaintiff in such an action must establish a reasonable
value of each of the items of his claim and any defense
thereto must necessarily determine this issue. Consequently
it has been held that in this character of case, the defendant,
to preserve his claim for damages, must set the same up by
recouping against the plaintiff's claim. °
Recoupment need not be pleaded but set up by notice
under the general issue," and where the same is set up and
relied upon no recovery over against the plaintiff can be
had, 2 but the trial and judgment thereon is res adjudicata
as to the matters therein set up.
8Merchants Heat & Light Co. v. Clow & Sons, 204 U. S. 286, 51 L. ed.
488 (1907) ; 24 R. C. L. 883.
9 34 Cyc. 758; 24 R. C. L. 883; Merchants Heat & Light Co. v. Clow &
Sons, supra n. 8; Wnthrop Savings Bank v. Jackson, 67 Me. 570, 24 Am.
Rep. 56 (1878).
1024 R. C. L. 884; Davenport v. Hubbard, supra, n. 4.
"1 Sterling Organ Co. v. House, 25 W. Va. 64 (1884); Franklin v. Lilly
Lumber Co., 66 W. Va. 164, 66 S. E. 225 (1909).
S12 B. & 0. H. R. Co. v. Bitner, 15 W. Va. 455 (1879); Natural Gas Co.
v. Healy, 33 W. Va. 102, 10 S. E. 56 (1889) ; Edgemoor Iron Co. V. Brown
Hoisting Co., 6 Penn. (Del.) 10, 62 AtI. 1054, 4 L. H. A. N. S. 858 (1906).
Is24 R. C. L. 883; B. & 0. R. H. Co. v. Bitner, supra n. 12; Knott v. Seamonds, 25 W. Va. 99 (1884); Bias v. Vickers, 27 W. Va. 456 (1886); 38
Ani. Hep. 415.
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Under the West Virginia statute, Chapter 126, Section 5,
commonly recognized as our statute on equitable defense at
law, it would appear to be an enlargement of the common
law right of recoupment. The Virginia court in construing
the same statute holds:
"When the demands of both parties spring out of
the same contract, the defendant may assert his claim
for unliquidated damages under his common law right
of recoupment, or under Section 3299 of the Code
(identical with West Virginia Code, Chapter 126,
Section 5), which does not impair his common law
right, but in addition thereto permits defendant to
recover any legal damages he can prove in excess of
the damages claimed by the plaintiff.""'
However, the West Virginia court most emphatically
holds that the common law right of recoupment has not been
enlarged by this statute, but remains the same, 5 so that
the, interpretation placed upon this statute by the West
Virginia Court leaves us with no statutory enlargement of
the common law remedy of recoupment.
The present West Virginia statute of set-off"0 was taken
from the Virginia statute, originally enacted in that Commonwealth as early as February, 1645, amended, however, in
1658, and again amended in March, 1662.1 This enactment
was much earlier than even the English Statute, the first
of which was passed in the second year of George II, found
in Chapter 22, Sec. 13, and later amended in the eighth year
of George II, by Chapter 24, Sec. 4, which, statute provides
generally that mutual accounts between litigants might be
set off, one against the other. It is claimed that the Virginia Statute of set-off, from which ours was taken, is much
broader than the English Statute.'
14 Letterman v. Charlottesville Lumber Co., supra, n. 1; N. N. & 0. R. Ry.
Co. v. Bickford, 105 Va. 182, 52 S. E. 1011 (1906) ; 5 Rob. Pr. 267.
15 Monongahela Tie & Lumber Co. v. Flannigan, supra, n. 1.
l BARNEs' W. VA. CODE, ch. 126, § 4.
17See Hennings Statutes, Vol. 1, pp. 296, 314, 449; Vol. 2, Hennings
Stats. 110.
18 Allen P. Hart, supra, n. 1; Wartman v. Yost, supra, n. 1, Folsom v.
Carli, 6 Minn. 420, 80 Am. Dec. 456 (1861) ;33 L. B. A. N. S. 376; Johnson
v. Johnson, supra, p. 3; Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Breckinridge, aupra, n. 1.
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Statutes of set-off being remedial in character are given
a liberal construction to accomplish the purposes for which
they were enacted,19 but the statute being the basis of the
remedy, the subject matter thereof, as well as the method
to be employed in asserting it, must conform to the statute.
The subject matter of the set-off must be such as would
support an independent cause of action against the plaintiff,2" and this independent cause of action must of necessity
grow out of and be based upon a contractural obligation.2
The scope of this article will not permit of that comprehensive consideration of this subject that is desirable; but
there are certain limitations to which the right of set-off
is subject that it might well be to briefly notice. The general
rule, subject to exceptions, however, is that the same defense
may be made to set-off that would be available against an
independent action where the same subject matter was the
basis thereof. In West Virginia a defendant may have
allowed to him as a set-off any debt due and owing from the
plaintiff to him which he describes and sets forth in his
plea or in an account filed therewith, such as will give notice
to the plaintiff of his claim, bearing in mind, however, that
the enforcement of this claim by this method is subject to
the same rules as obtain with reference to the enforcement
of the same claim if it were the basis of an independent
action. We may notice some of the limitations to which this
remedy is subject. For instance, it will not lie against a
claim for exempt property, such as property that may be
set apart for the benefit of a householder free from claims of
his creditors, which right is usually authorized by constitutional provision, and to permit a defendant to set-off against
such a claim would amount to defeating the claim, as well

'9

34 Cyc 629.

20 1914-A Ann. Cas. 386; 1914-B Ann. Cas.
21 B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Jameson, supra, n. 1.

124.
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22
as the constitutional right to make the same, nor will set-

off lie in actions for tort or to set-off unliquidated damages.
This remedy is limited exclusively to contractural obliga-

tions which are liquidated or subject to be liquidated by
computation. This excludes all damages arising out of tort
or breach of contract.2
On the principle that an action may not be prosecuted
against the State or Federal Government without its consent,
set-off will not lie against the claim of the State.2" In some
jurisdictions claimants have been permitted to recoup to the
extent of the State's claim, such, for instance, as where the
State contracts her prison labor; in an action to recover
for the contract price, the defendant has been permitted to
recoup damages to the extent of such claim by showing that
the state failed to furnish the required number of laborers.2
Set-off must be mutual, both with reference to parties and
subject matter, the test generally being whether the defendant claiming set-off could prosecute an independent
cause of action against the party or parties against whom he
However, this does
seeks to enforce such claim of set-off.2
off
assigned claims
setting
not preclude a defendant from
against the plaintiff which have been duly assigned to him
and such assignments, according to the greater weight of
judicial decision, may be acquired up to the time of the
filing of the set-off. However, a different rule obtains in
22 Bradley v. Earl, 22 N. Dak. 139, 132 N. W. 660, 42 L. R. A. N. S.
575 (1911); Beckman v. Manlove, 18 Cal. 388 (1861); Cone v. Lewis, 64
Tex. 331, 53 Am. Rep. 767 (1885) ; Elder v. Trevert, 18 Nev. 446, 5 Pae. 69
(1884) ; Wilson u. McElroy, 32 Pa. 82 (1858) ; Sirmans v. Sirmans, 74 Ga.
See note, Caldwell v. Ryan, 210 Mo. 17, 108 S. W. 533, 16
541 (1885).
L. R. A. N. S. 494 (1908); Cleveland v. McCanna, 7 N. Dak. 455, 75 N. W.
908, 41 L. R. A. 852 (1898).
23 Hooper-Mankin Fuel Co v. Shrewsbury Coal Co., 94 W. Va. 442, 119 S.
E. 176 (1923); Zimmerman Wells-Brown Co. v. Sunset Lumber Co., 57
Ore. 599, 111 Pac. 690 (1910). See 24 L. R. A. N. S. 748.
24 Moore v. Tate, 87 Tenn 725, 11 S. W. 935, 10 Am.St. Rep. 712 (1889);
Raymond v. State, 54 Miss. 562, 28 Am. Rep. 382 (1877).
25 Arkansas v. Arkansas Brick & Mfg. Co., 98 Ark. 125, 136 S. W. 843,
33 L. R. A. N. S. 376 (1911); See note, State v. Tillou, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 486,
18 L. ed. 920 (1867); U. S. v. Steamer, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 154, 19 L. ed.
129 (1868).
2624 R. C. L. 858; Navigation Co. v. Rice, 9 W. Va. 636 (1876); Bd. of
Education v. Cain, 28 W. Va. 768 (1886).
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reference to commercial paper negotiated for value before
maturity. This character of claim is not subject to set-off.
Some courts have gone so far as to hold that commercial
paper, negotiated after maturity, is likewise exempt from
a claim of set-off.2" The West Virginia Court specifically
passed upon this question in Davis v. Noll, and announced
the rule obtaining in this jurisdiction to be:
"A bona fide purchaser, for value, of an overdue negotiable instrument, holds it subject only to such equities as
attach to the instrument itself at the time of the transfer,
of which he has no notice."Y
The rule, however, supported by the greater weight of
authority is that negotiable paper transferred after maturity
is subject to set-off in the same manner as any ordinary
assignable claim.28
The statute of limitations runs against a claim of set-off
until the same is actually filed and such claim is subject
to such statute in the same manner and to the same extent
as if such claim was sought to be enforced in an independent
action.28
Set-off is a cause of action prosecuted by the defendant
against the plaintiff," and is not in any sense to be treated
or considered as a defense to the plaintiff's action,"' but on
the other hand, set-off and recoupment admit the plaintiff's
22
demand.
The defendant is not required under our statute to assert
his claim of set-off, but where he does so he is bound thereby." Statutes generally oil set-off, and particularly the
27

BuRK, PLDG. & PnAc., 441; Davis v. Noll, 38

W. Va. 66, 17 S. E. 791

(1893).

R. C. L. 821.
29Hurst v. Hite, 20 W. Va. 183 (1882); Trymer v. Pollard, 5 Gratt.
(Va.) 460 (1849).
3 BARNES' W. VA. CODE, ch. 126, § 9.
2824

s 34 Cyc. 644.
32 34 Cyc. 759-60.
38 34 CyO. 758; 24 R. C. L. 883; Merchants Heat & Light Co. v. Clow &

Sons, supra, n. 8; Winthrop Savings Bank v. Jackson, supra, n. 9; 24 Am.
Rep. 56 (1878).
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statute in the Virginias, provide that a litigant "may"
assert his claim against the plaintiff by set-off, but his failure
to do so does not in any wise prejudice his prosecution of
an independent cause of action therefor. The statute does
not deprive one of his common law right, but is remedial in
character and purposes to enlarge rather than restrict common law rights. While there are no strict technical rules
to be observed in the filing of the plea of set-off, still a claim
to be available as set-off must be filed in the action so that
the plaintiff may have timely notice of the defendant's cross
4
demand. Unless this is done it is not available.
However, in Virginia and West Virginia, the procedure
by notice of motion for judgment is so informal that a defendant may prove set-off under the general issue without
notice. The informality of this character of procedure seems
to be the only justification for relaxing the statut6 ry requirement of the filing of the plea or an account with the plea.",
Vlotwithstanding the marked distinction between the
remedies of recoupment and set-off, the application of these
remedies present most difficult questions. For instance, take
the case of a non-resident prosecuting a claim against a
resident of this state, who, at the same time, has an unliquidated claim against the non-resident plaintiff, which
unliquidated claim grows out of an entirely different transaction than that sued on by the plaintiff, the plaintiff, in
addition to being a non-resident of the state, may also be insolvent; against the non-resident plaintiff's claim, the resident defendant has no defense; under such a state of facts
it would be most desirable to have settled and determined
in the plaintiff's case the unliquidated claim of the resident
defendant. This, however, he cannot do either by set-off or
recoupment. He cannot set-off because his demand is unliquidated, and even though he only desires to recoup
84 BANES' W. VA. CODE, ch. 126, § 4; Gutherie v. Huntington Chair Co.,
69 W. Va. 152, 71 S. E. 14 (1911); Teeter v. George, 86 W. Va. 464, 103
S. E. 275 (1920).
8Whitley v. Booker Brick Co., 114 Va. 434, 74 S. E. 160 (1912);
Schmulbach v. Williams, 95 W. Va. 281, 120 S. E. 600 (1923).
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damages to the extent of extinguishing the plaintiff's claim,
this he may not do because the unliquidated claim for
damages grows out of a different transaction from the one
sued on by the plaintiff."
Another illustration of the inadequacy of these remedies
presents itself when a plaintiff seeks judgment for money
due under a contract. The plaintiff may have so breached
the contract as to cause the defendant to sustain damages
is a much larger sum than the amount claimed to be due
by the plaintiff. If the defendant resorts to recoupment he
must waive all that portion of his claim for damages that
may be in excess of the plaintiff's demand. He cannot resort
to set-off because his claim is unliquidated and grows out
of the same transaction as that sued on by the plaintiff.
Appropriate legislation should be enacted so as to enlarge
the remedy of recoupment so that recovery over may be
had in all such instances.
The last illustration submitted was taken from the facts
in a recent case passed upon by the West Virginia Court.
In that case the defendant claiming a breach of the contract
sued on set up a claim for damages largely in excess of the
plaintiff's claim. This cross demand was represented by a
notice of recoupment and also a notice of set-off under the
general issue. Upon the trial the court directed a verdict
in favor of the defendant for a recovery over against the
plaintiff in excess of the plaintiff's claim. The case was
prosecuted by writ of error to the Supreme Court where the
judgment of the lower court was reversed solely on the
ground that a verdict should not have been directed, but
that there was such a conflict in the evidence as made it a
case for jury determination. The question of the defendant's right to recover over in this case seems not to have
been questioned, either in the trial or appellate court. To
be denied this right when both of the parties are before the
court contesting their differences over a single transaction,
36 Van Raalte v. Solof Bros. Co., supra, n. 3.
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must conclusively demonstrate the imperative demand and
necessity for the enlargement of the common law remedy of
recoupment.
It is oftentimes difficult to determine just' what is meant
by the term "unliquidated damages." A claim may call
for an amount represented by the difference between the
contract price and the market price of a commodity at a
given time and place. There may be no dispute as to the
market price, upon which state of facts one may conclude
that the claim, while not definite and certain, is subject to
be made so by calculation, and hence is, or subject to become, a liquidated demand. However much these facts
may make this claim appear to be liquidated, it is not so
recognized by the authorities. No such claim as rests in
opinion that must be fixed -by a jury is regarded as a liquidated claim. A claim to be liquidated must be such as is
fixed and certain or is subject to be made so by calculation
from a fixed, definite and undisputed premise. 8
While set-off is not a common law remedy, courts of equity
have always recognized it and applied it in causes where doing so would be equitable and not to do so would be inequitable. 9 The right to set-off in equity must be grounded upon
some principle recognized in equity."' One of the most common occurrences for the application of equitable set-off is
37

Superior Elkhorn By-Products Coal Co. v. Three-States

Coal Co., 106

W. Va. 270, 145 S. E. 436 (1928).
aSHooper-Mankin Fuel Co. v. Shrewsbury Coal Co., supra, n. 23; HOGO,
PLDG. & PRAc. 203; Navigation Co. v. Rice, supra, n 3; Guano Co. v. Appling, supra,n. 3; Hargreaves v. Kimberly, 26 W. Va. 787 (1885) ; 24 R. C1.
L. 856; Tidewater Quarry Co. v. Scott, supra, n. 3.
39 24 R. C. L. 803; B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Jameson, supra, n. 1; Johnson v.
JohNsoN, supra, n. 3; Steck v. Col. Fuel Co., 142 N. Y. 230, 37 N. E. 1
(1894); Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499, 36 L. cd. 1059 (1802); Rolling
Mill Co. v. Steel Mill Co., 152 U. S. 596, 38 L. ed. 565 (1893).
40 Rolling Mill Co. v. Steel Mill Co., supra, n. 39; Gray V. Rollo, 18 Wall.
(U. S.) 598, 21 L. ed. 927 (1873); Caldwell v. Stevens, 64 Okla. 287, 167
Pac. 610 (1917); Porter v. Roseman, 165 Ind. 255, 74 N. E. 1105 (1905);
Mylius v. Massillon Engine & Thresher Co., 70 W. Va. 576, 74 S. E. 728
(1912); 34 Cyc. 634-39-40; Dade -. Irwin, 2 How. (U. S.) 383, 11 L. ed.
308 (1844); Jarrett v. Goodnow, 39 W. Va. 602, 20 S. E. 575 (1894);
Harvey v. Ryan 59 W. Va. 134, 53 S. E. 7 (1906); White v. Moss, 88 W.
Va. 1, 1P6 S.E. 72 (1921).
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where the principal debtor is insolvent and to permit him
to collect his claim from one to whom he is indebted might
result in defeating the rights of such other to collect against
4 1

him.

Our statute providing for the making of equitable defenses
at law, does not deprive equity of jurisdiction where equity
would have had jurisdiction in the absence of such statute.
2
The statute is remedial and cumulative of the common law.

The statutory remedy of set-off being cumulative of the
common law does not in any wise restrict or limit the jurisdiction of courts of equity to administer or apply the remedy
of set-off in the same manner and to the same extent as if
the statute did not exist, nor. is one required to give reason
or excuse for failing to set-off at law under the statute in
order to invoke the jurisdiction of a court of equity."'
In the prosecution of the remedies of recoupment and setoff the defendant has the affirmative, the claim of the plaintiff being admitted, the only question for determination is
that arising on these cross demands. Upon the defendant
is the burden of establishing his cross demand by a preponderence of the evidence in the same manner and to the same
extent as he would be required so to do if he were prosecuting
an independent cause of action therefor. This burden and
responsibility carries with it, however, the right of his counsel
to open and close the argument before the jury.4
The remedies of recoupment and set-off are controlled by
the law of the forum. The right which a defendant may
have to make cross demands, either by recoupment or set-off,
is not compulsory. He may elect to do so or reserve the
right to present his cross demands in an independent action.
The common law right thus to do is not taken away by
41 Armitage Herschel Co. v. Jacob Barnett Amusement Co., 109 Minn.
468, 124 N. W. 233, 27 L. R. A. N. S. 811 (1910).
42 34 Cyc. 634-3940; Bias v. Vickers, supra, n. 13.
43AMylius V. Massillon Engine & Thresher Co., 70 W. Va. 576, 74 S. E.
729 (1912); White v. Moss, supra, n. 40; Harvey v. Ryan, supra, n. 40.
44 Sammons & Piercy v. Hawvers, 25 W. Va. 678 (1885); Levine Bros. v.
Mantell, supra n. 3.
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reason of the statute,4 r but where he elects to make cross
demand by either remedy, judgment thereon is res adjudicata
as to all matters and claims therein determined."'
Recoupment and set-off are remedies and not pleas. They
are independent causes of action and not defenses, but for
them the prosecution of independent actions would be necessary. By and through them this is avoided, permitting
cross demands between litigants to be settled and determined
in one action. To skilfully apply these beneficent remedies
is the exclusive function of the legal profession. May it so
discharge this duty that these remedies may be enlarged and
extended by statutory enactment.

Since the preparation of this article my attention has been
called to specific recommendations made by Dean Arnold,
Professor Simonton and Professor Havighurst of the faculty
of West Virginia University Law School, contained in the
Law Quarterly for December, 1929, with reference to joinder
of claims and parties as appears, pages 44-51 of the Quarterly.
Dean Arnold and his Committee have given very capable
consideration to this very important subject of practice and
have very skilfully developed the idea that joinder of parties
litigant, plaintiff or defendant, should not be divorced from
joinder of subject matter.
On this question I can vision much controversy; extending
from that school of thought which believes that a legal contest should be limited to a single controversy exclusively
between the interested parties; though another class believing that the limitation should apply only to parties with the
right to determine between the parties more than one controversy, on to that still other class believing, as does Dean
Arnold's Committee, that the necessity for any controversy
should justify the unlimited joinder of parties, as well as
subject matter. As a matter of practice, the subject matter
45sDavis v. Moll, 38 W. Va. 66, 17 S. E. 791 (1893) ; Buar, PDO. & Paao.
443.
4624 R. C. L. 883; B. & 0.
. R. Co. v. Bitner, supra, n. 12; Knott v.
Seamonds, supra, n. 13; Bias v. Vickers supra, n. 13.
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of controversies may be extended so as to permit more than
one independent cause of action to be determined so long
as the subject matter is limited to parties who have a common
and mutual interest in such controversies. Particularly is
this true where the defendant has a demand which he desires
to assert against the plaintiff that cannot properly be made
the subject matter of set-off or recoupment. In such case
the remedy of recoupment should be enlarged so as to give
to the defendant the right to assert by cross demand against
the plaintiff any unliquidated claim which he may have growing out of a breach not only of the contract sued on by the
plaintiff but the breach of any other obligation on the part
of the plaintiff, and be entitled to recover over against the
plaintiff such amount as may be in excess of the plaintiff's
claim. So far as Dean Arnold's Committee on proposed
legislation extends in this respect I am willing to endorse
unqualifiedly. I am aware of the fact that there are many in
the profession that would be agreeable to extending the right
of the defendant to recoup unliquidated damages in a tort
action. While there may be virtue in this position, I am
not now convinced of it. My consideration of the remedies
of set-off and recoupment have not been set forth with any
view of influencing legislation, but solely with the view to
presenting the practical application of these remedies as they
obtain in our practice today. In as much as both of these
remedies find their basis in the subject matter of an independent cause of action to be asserted by the defendant against
the plaintiff, they might well be superseded by simple statutory enactment, which would Jive to the defendant the right
to assert against the plaintiff any demand which he may
have, which may be made the subject matter of an independent cause of action and the relief to be obtained therein not
limited by the amount of the plaintiff's demand. This would
comprehend all rights of the defendant by set-off or recoupment and permit recovery over in that class of cases where
the defendant's demand was for unliquidated damages and
may have arisen out of a breach of a different contract from
that sued on by the plaintiff.
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